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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1981 Montana legislature enacted numerous changes to
the state's probate laws. Most of the amendments codified lan-
guage of the Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.) that was either not
adopted in the original enactment in Montana or was subsequently
modified by the U.P.C.'s Joint Editorial Board.' This article can-
vasses the changes of most importance to the practicing attorney
in Montana. Particular attention is given to amendments to the
statutes covering the perplexing field of ancillary administration.
1. The U.P.C. Joint Editorial Board was created to revise the U.P.C. after its promul-
gation in 1969. The Board is composed of ten members, half from the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and half from The Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association.
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II. FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES AND ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATION
A. Introduction
One change of Montana's probate laws made by the 1981 legis-
lature was more accurate adoption of Article IV of the U.P.C. pro-
visions on foreign personal representatives and ancillary adminis-
tration. While the legislature basically enacted Article IV of the
U.P.C. in 1975, they altered some of the U.P.C. language, and ad-
ded statutes designed to protect the Montana inheritance tax on
estate assets located in this state but subject to probate in the
state where decedent was domiciled. The U.P.C. revision commit-
tee of the Tax and Probate Section of the Montana Bar Associa-
tion subsequently concluded that the Montana statutes were un-
clear and recommended adoption of the U.P.C. language. The 1981
legislature concurred and amended most of the Montana statutes
to conform to Article IV of the U.P.C. The statutes not amended'
were designed to protect the state's inheritance tax, but, as will be
demonstrated, these laws create inconsistency.
Pre-U.P.C. law usually required two separate and complete
administration procedures for an estate with assets located in more
than one state. Double administration was inevitably costly and
complex. The aim of Article IV of the U.P.C. is to encourage a
simpler, more unified administration. This was essentially accom-
plished by two techniques. First, the U.P.C. gives substantial pow-
ers to the personal representative (PR) appointed in the state of
decedent's domicile.4 The powers of this domiciliary PR extend to
any state which has enacted the U.P.C., regardless of whether the
state of domicile has adopted it. Hence, a domiciliary PR ap-
pointed in Illinois, a non-U.P.C. state, can exercise the U.P.C. pow-
ers in Montana. 5 The second technique used by the U.P.C. drafters
to achieve a unified administration of a multi-state estate was to
2. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] §§ 72-4-303, -304 and -305
(1981). Unless otherwise noted, the citations in this article are to the statutes amended by
the 1981 legislature as they will appear in the 1981 codification.
3. Vestal, Detailed Discussion of Article IV, 1 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MAN-
uAL 432 (R. Wellman ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Vestal].
4. In disputes over which state was the state of domicile of a decedent, a final order of
a court of another state which is based on a finding of domicile is controlling. MCA § 72-3-
312 (1981). If courts in two states have simultaneous domicile disputes pending, the U.P.C.
requires Montana to stay any proceeding and honor the finding of the other state unless the
Montana proceeding was commenced first. MCA § 72-3-114 (1981).
5. The converse, however, is not true: A PR appointed in a U.P.C. state does not have
U.P.C. powers in a state which has not enacted the U.P.C. See L. AVERILL, JR., UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 25.01 (1978)..
[Vol. 42316
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grant the domiciliary PR priority of appointment over all other
persons, except those nominated in the will, in the selection of a
local PR. Estate administration was thus streamlined by having
one person serve as both the domiciliary and the local PR.
After discussing these two techniques, this part of the article
examines the role of resident creditors in ancillary administration,
distribution of estate assets, and Montana's jurisdiction over the
foreign PR.
B. Powers of the Domiciliary Personal Representative
The first technique used to unify estate administration in two
states is to grant two powers to the domiciliary PR acting in this
state. The first power, defined in MCA § 72-4-306 (1981), permits
the domiciliary PR, sixty days after a non-resident decedent's
death, to collect two types of personal property: that owned by the
decedent but in the possession of persons in this state, and money
owed the decedent by debtors residing in this state.' This author-
ity is exercised by the appointed domiciliary PR by presenting the
debtor or person in possession of the decedent's asset with proof of
the appointment in the foreign state and with an affidavit stating,
in addition to the date of death, that no administration or petition
for one is pending in this state, and that the domiciliary PR has
the right to receive the asset.7 The debtor is not forced to pay the
domiciliary PR; the debtor can refuse and thus force the domicili-
ary PR to use other methods to secure payment.6
Persons who do pay or deliver property to the domiciliary PR
may receive the same protection from liability afforded one who
deals with a local PR.9 Exactly when that protection applies, al-
though clearly stated in the U.P.C.,' 0 is uncertain in the Montana
statute. This problem is due to an inconsistency between two of
the Montana laws. The U.P.C. is consistent: both payment or de-
livery and the release from liability are based on the proof of au:
thority and the affidavit." The Montana laws provide, however, on
the one hand, that payment of the debt or delivery of the asset to
the domiciliary PR is sanctioned when the debtor or holder of de-
6. The assets subject to this statute are personal property, or "instrument[s] evidenc-
ing a debt, obligation, stock or chose in action belonging to the estate of the non-resident
decedent .... " MCA § 72-4-306 (1981). Securities are excluded.
7. MCA § 72-4-306 (1981).
8. Vestal, supra note 3, at 434.
9. MCA § 72-4-307 (1981). For the protections given a person who deals with a local
PR, see MCA §§ 72-3-606 and -618 (1981).
10. U.P.C. § 4-202.
11. Compare U.P.C. § 4-201 with U.P.C. § 4-202.
1981] 317
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cedent's property is presented with the proof of authority and affi-
davit. On the other hand, however, the statute granting the protec-
tion to one who does pay the debt or deliver the property requires
payment or delivery to be made on the basis of a certificate of the
clerk of court and a certificate of the Montana Department of Rev-
enue.12 This inconsistency may lead an unwary debtor of the dece-
dent to make payment to the domiciliary PR on the basis of the
proof of authority and affidavit, only to find out later that there
was no release from liability because the domiciliary PR never
presented the debtor with the certificates of the clerk of court and
Department of Revenue.
The clerk of court's certificate is the equivalent of the proof of
authority and the affidavit which the domiciliary PR must present
to collect an asset of the estate. 3 Consequently, presenting the
person who has the asset or owes the debt with the proof of au-
thority and affidavit may satisfy one of the two requirements for
release from liability.14 But the second requirement of showing the
person the certificate of the Department of Revenue will not be
met. 1 5 The person paying the debt or handing over the asset, there-
fore, will not receive the statutory protection by delivering the as-
set on the basis of the proof of authority and the affidavit. Thus,
an attorney for a debtor or one holding decedent's personal prop-
erty should require the domiciliary PR to present both certificates
along with the proof of authority and the affidavit. Alternatively,
the debtor can refuse to pay the debt or the holder of the property
can refuse to deliver. Such refusal will force the domicilary PR to
exercise the second power authorized by the statutes.
The second power afforded the domiciliary PR is designed,
like the power to collect estate assets, to unify and simplify estate
administration. MCA § 72-4-301 (1981) permits the domiciliary
PR, through a simple filing procedure, to acquire all the powers of
a locally appointed PR over the assets located in Montana and to
sue and be sued in this state.1 The power is acquired by filing
12. Compare MCA § 72-4-306 (1981) with MCA § 72-4-307 (1981).
13. Compare MCA § 72-4-303 (1981) with MCA § 72-4-306 (1981). The former pro-
vides that the certificate of the clerk of court will issue when three documents are filed with
the clerk of court in the county where the property is located or the debtor resides. These
three documents are authenticated copies of appointment and of any official bond given, an
inventory and appraisal of the property pursuant to MCA § 72-3-607 (1981), and an affida-
vit stating both decedent's date of death and that no local administration or petition for one
is pending. See text accompanying notes 7 and 8 supra.
14. MCA § 72-4-307 (1981).
15. Id. The certificate of the Department of Revenue is given when the state inheri-
tance tax is paid or satisfactory bond is posted. MCA § 72-4-304 (1981).
16. The powers conferred are those provided for in Article III of the U.P.C. for an
[Vol. 42318
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authenticated copies of the appointment and of any bond given in
the county where the non-resident decedent's assets are located or
the debtor of the decedent resides.17 Once this power is obtained,
the domiciliary PR can sue recalcitrant debtors or do whatever else
is authorized by the statutes to settle and distribute the estate.18
Both powers discussed above-the authority to collect estate
assets and to use the power of a local PR-are terminated when a
local administration or a petition for one is pending."9 The local
court may, however, allow the domiciliary PR limited powers to
preserve a decedent's assets when the full power has been discon-
tinued.2 0 The statutes also protect individuals dealing with the
domiciliary PR whose powers have been terminated, if they did
not have actual notice of a petition for local administration." Fi-
nally, to assure continuity of administration, the newly-appointed
local PR is subject to all duties and obligations created by the
domiciliary PR."1 For instance, a contract made by the domiciliary
PR to sell land for estate administration purposes is binding on
the successor PR.
C. Priority of Appointment of the Domiciliary Personal
Representative
The filing of a petition for local administration, as indicated,
terminates the two powers of the domiciliary PR. When this oc-
curs, the second technique formulated by the U.P.C. drafters to
reduce the complexity of ancillary administration is activated. This
method is expressed in provisions adopted by the 1975 legislature
which were not altered by the 1981 legislature.
MCA § 72-3-506 (1981) all but guarantees that, when an ancil-
lary administration is begun, the domiciliary PR will also be the
person chosen as the local PR. This selection is accomplished by
providing that the priority of the domiciliary PR supersedes the
priority of others in appointment of a local PR to administer a
decedent's local assets.' Only one person has more priority than
the domiciliary PR: a person nominated in the will to be the local
unsupervised administration. U.P.C., art. IV, General Comment.
17. MCA § 72-4-301 (1981).
18. See generally MCA §§ 72-3-610 and -613 (1981).
19. MCA § 72-4-302(1) (1981).
20. Id.
21. MCA § 72-4-302(2) (1981).
22. Id.
23. Generally, priority of appointment is listed at MCA § 72-3-502 (1981). The priority
of the domiciliary PR is conferred in MCA § 72-3-506 (1981).
1981]
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PR.2 4 MCA § 72-3-225(1) (1981) bolsters the preference for ap-
pointment of the domiciliary PR by delaying appointment of a lo-
cal PR to administer assets of a non-resident decedent for thirty
days unless the domiciliary PR is the applicant.25 In those in-
stances where a local PR is appointed before a domiciliary PR,
MCA § 72-3-526(3) (1981) allows the domiciliary PR to have the
local PR removed from appointment, unless the will provides for
separate PRs.
D. Resident Creditors
Resident creditors, defined as creditors of a non-resident dece-
dent who live or do business in Montana, are affected by the new
statutes.28 Of direct concern to them are the time period within
which claims against the estate must be filed, and their right to
blunt the domiciliary PR's power to collect assets of the estate.
Where there is an estate administration in the state of the de-
cedent's domicile, that state's nonclaim statute governs. Nonclaim
statutes set a time limit for presenting claims against the estate,
which, if not met, act as a permanent bar to the claim. All claims
barred in the state of domicile before the first publication of notice
in Montana are also barred here." Thus, while the domiciliary PR
must begin the notice to creditors in the ancillary jurisdiction at
the time of appointment,"8 it is possible the date the ancillary ad-
ministration is begun will be after creditors' claims have been
barred. For example, a person domiciled in Idaho and owning
property in Montana dies. Because Idaho has enacted the U.P.C., 2"
all creditor claims there must be asserted within four months of
the first publication of notice or be forever barred.30 If the Idaho
PR opens an ancillary administration in Montana one week after
creditor claims have been barred in Idaho, all claims thereafter
filed in Montana or Idaho are barred.
Resident creditors are in an onerous position: if the domicili-
ary PR does not begin ancillary administration until the time limit
of the nonclaim statute expires in the state of domicile, and the
Montana creditor does not open an administration here because
24. MCA § 72-3-506 (1981).
25. For example, if adopted in the decedent's state of domicile, the U.P.C. permits
informal appointment there five days after decedent's death. U.P.C. § 3-302.
26. MCA § 72-4-101(3) (1981).
27. MCA § 72-3-803(1)(a) (1981). Tort claims and claims for taxes are excepted.
28. MCA § 72-3-801 (1981).
29. IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to 15-7-307 (1979).
30. U.P.C. § 3-803(a)(1).
[Vol. 42
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the creditor is not aware of decedent's death, then the resident
creditor cannot assert the claim. For protection, a creditor with
knowledge of the death of a non-resident decedent should initiate
ancillary administration in Montana, if one has not been com-
menced soon after the death.31 The opening of an administration
here before the nonclaim statute of limitations has run at domicile
extends the deadline for claims by Montana residents to the period
of our nonclaim statute."' Or, the resident creditor may simply use
the administration in the state of domicile to enforce the claim.
As discussed above, the domiciliary PR has the power to col-
lect the assets of the estate.33 MCA § 72-4-308 (1981) permits a
resident creditor of the non-resident decedent to notify a debtor or
holder of property of the decedent to withhold payment or deliv-
ery to the domiciliary PR. This action will stop payment or deliv-
ery. 4 The right should be exercised by a creditor who wishes to
prevent the local assets from being taken to the state of domicile.
E. Distribution of the Estate
Distribution of the ancillary estate is regulated chiefly by two
statutes enacted by the 1975 Montana legislature.3 A key provi-
sion makes all estate assets administered in this state "subject to
all claims, allowances, and charges existing or established against
the personal representative wherever appointed." 6 Another section
states that family exemptions and allowances provided for by the
law of the state of domicile must be satisfied before local claims.87
Claims allowed locally and in the domicile state should be satisfied
next; if the claims are greater than the assets, then each claimant
receives an equal proportion of his or her claim. 8 If the assets ex-
ceed the claims, then local assets are used to satisfy local claims,
and the remainder is given to the domiciliary PR.3 9 The statutes
also require a local PR to transfer all local estate assets to the
domiciliary PR with three exceptions: one, if the will identifies
devisees according to Montana law; two, if a domiciliary PR does
31. Vestal, supra note 3, at 440. MCA § 72-3-502(7) (1981) allows creditors to initiate
an administration.
32. The period of our nonclaim statute is four months. MCA § 72-8-803(1) (1981). See
also Vestal, supra note 3, at 440.
33. MCA § 72-4-306 (1981).
34. U.P.C., art. IV, General Comment; Vestal, supra note 3, at 434.
35. MCA §§ 72-3-821 and -822 (1981).
36. MCA § 72-3-821(1) (1981).
37. MCA § 72-3-821(2) (1981).
38. Id.
39. MCA § 72-3-821(3) (1981).
19811
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not exist or cannot reasonably be ascertained; and, three, if the
court's closing order provides otherwise.4
F. Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Personal Representative
The former statutes dealing with jurisdiction over foreign per-
sonal representatives are not, for the most part, changed by the
recent enactment. Montana gains jurisdiction over the foreign
domiciliary PR in four circumstances. First, any PR who accepts
appointment in this state submits to personal jurisdiction in all
estate proceedings begun by interested persons.41 Secondly, per-
sonal jurisdiction is acquired where a foreign PR, in order to re-
ceive the powers of a local PR,42 files in the local court authenti-
cated copies of the appointment and of any official bond given.43
Thirdly, jurisdiction is obtained when money or property are re-
ceived pursuant to the power to collect estate assets," but is lim-
ited to the value of the assets collected.'6 And, fourthly, the foreign
PR concedes jurisdiction to Montana by performing acts here as a
PR which are sufficient to give the state personal jurisdiction.'6
The above methods of obtaining jurisdiction should meet the con-
stitutional requirement of sufficient minimum contact between the
foreign PR and the state.47 The statutes also cover the situation
where, for example, a non-resident dies in an automobile accident
in this state because of his or her own tortious conduct; MCA § 72-
4-202 (1981) subjects a foreign PR to the same jurisdiction in this
state to which the decedent was liable. Methods of service of pro-
cess on the foreign PR are also delineated.48
G. Conclusion
The purpose of the drafters of the U.P.C. was to simplify an-
cillary administration and to unify the administrations in the state
of domicile and the foreign jurisdiction. The means chosen were to
coordinate the administrations and invest certain powers in the
40. MCA §§ 72-3-822(1)(a), (b) and (c) (1981).
41. MCA § 72-3-511 (1981).
42. MCA § 72-4-301 (1981).
43. MCA § 72-4-201(1)(a) (1981).
44. MCA § 72-4-201(1)(b) (1981).
45. MCA § 72-4-201(2) (1981).
46. MCA § 74-4-201(1)(c) (1981).
47. Vestal, supra note 3, at 442-43. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 316 U.S. 310 (1945). These cases require
sufficient minimum contacts with a state, as well as fairness to the litigant, before a state
can assert jurisdiction over a non-resident.
48. MCA § 72-4-203 (1981).
[Vol. 42
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domiciliary PR. Montana's recent statutory enactments will not
substantially change ancillary administration here; our laws before
the 1981 legislature's action were already, in large measure, drawn
from the U.P.C. The hope of those who urged adoption of U.P.C.
language where it had not already been codified was to reduce con-
fusion and uncertainty in ancillary administration.
II. RENUNCIATION
Montana law on renunciation of a devised or inherited interest
was modified in three notable ways to conform to basic changes in
the U.P.C. Affected are the time limit in which renunciation must
be made, whether a representative of an incapacitated or protected
person may renounce, and whether an interest renounced by a
spouse should be charged against the elective share.
The time limit within which a renunciation had to be made
under the previous U.P.C.4'9 and Montana sections"0 was six
months after the death of a decedent. One purpose of the six-
month limit was to conform the provision to Internal Revenue
Code regulations which, at one time, negated federal gift taxes on
property renounced within "a reasonable time" after knowledge of
the devise or inheritance."1 Courts generally construed a renuncia-
tion made within six months to have been within a reasonable
time.5 2 In 1976 a nine-month time limit was substituted for a six-
month period in the Internal Revenue Code.53 Since federal law
now uses the nine-month time limit, a potential problem existed
with Montana's six-month period. For example, a renunciation
made seven months after a decedent's death would qualify within
the federal time period, but the renunciation would not meet the
state requirement. Therefore, because federal law requies a renun-
ciation to be "irrevocable and unqualified,"" the failure to meet
the Montana time limit might have led to a holding that the re-
nunciation was not "irrevocable and unqualified." 5 In that in-
stance, federal gift taxes would apply. Hence, the U.P.C. Joint Edi-
torial Board adopted a period of nine months from death within
which the renunciation must be made. The 1981 Montana legisla-
49. U.P.C. § 2-801(b)(1) (1975 version).
50. MCA § 72-2-101(2)(a) (1981).
51. Tress. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
52. Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
53. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2). Now the transfer must generally be made within nine months
after the interest is created in order to avoid a gift tax.
54. I.R.C. § 2518(b).
55. Id.
1981]
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ture agreed.
The second significant change in the Montana law of renuncia-
tion was to permit, as the current U.P.C. does,' e "the representa-
tive of an incapacitated or protected person" to renounce an inter-
est passing to the ward.57 Under state law the court has the power
to renounce for an incapacitated person" and, possibly, for a mi-
nor." Prior law, however, did not expressly grant the conservator
or guardian that power." The new provision does grant that power.
Allowing the guardian or conservator to renounce for a protected
or incapacitated person follows the general rule.6" Note that Mon-
tana still allows, and the 1977 U.P.C. does not allow, a personal
representative to renounce an interest given a decedent.2
A third amendment to renunciation statutes concerns the ef-
fect of a spouse's renunciation on the elective share of the aug-
mented estate. The new section alters Montana law so that now
property "which would have passed to the spouse but [was] re-
nounced" is applied against the spouse's elective share." For ex-
ample, a decedent devised a life estate to the surviving spouse and
that spouse renounced the life estate in order to acquire a fee sim-
ple interest through the elective share proceeding. The rationale of
the U.P.C. drafters is that, in this instance, the value of renounced
property should be applied against the elective share because the
decedent had provided for the spouse in the will. Renounced prop-
erty, therefore, is charged against the elective share as though the
property were accepted. The effect of this revision is to protect a
decedent's will to the extent it gives property to the surviving
spouse.
IV. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Two adjustments of intestate succession statutes made by the
1981 legislature harmonize our law with the U.P.C. One change
concerns who may inherit when the decedent dies intestate; the
other affects inheritance by adopted children.
The U.P.C. has consistently limited inheritance to grandpar-
ents and those descended from them where there were no surviving
56. U.P.C. § 2-801(a).
57. MCA § 72-2-101(1) (1981).
58. MCA § 72-5-421(3)(h) (1981).
59. MCA § 72-5-421(2) (1981).
60. MCA § 72-5-231, -321 and -428 (1981).
61. U.P.C. § 2-801(a), Comment. See 21 A.L.R.3d 320 (1968).
62. Compare MCA § 72-2-101(1) (1981) with U.P.C. § 2-801(a).
63. MCA § 72-2-706(1) (1981).
[Vol. 42
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issue, parent or issue of a parent. 4 The rationale for the line of
succession limitation was to avoid challenges to a will by remote
relatives and to eliminate difficulties of proof of heirship. 6 Mon-
tana, however, in enacting the U.P.C. in 1975, chose not to cut off
intestate succession at any point but instead allowed, as did prior
state law,6" the collaterals who can inherit to extend indefinitely. 7
The new provisions, like the U.P.C., restrict intestate heirs to
grandparents or lineal descendants of grandparents."
The second change in our intestate succession law eliminates
the possibility of double inheritance that existed in Montana
before the amendment. Prior state law allowed adopted children to
receive intestate shares from both natural and adoptive parents."
The U.P.C.7 0 and new Montana law7' give an adopted person the
intestate share of only the adoptive parents, thereby cutting off
inheritance from the natural parents. Another section of the
U.P.C.,7 2 also codified by the 1981 legislature, 78 expressly elimi-
nates the chance of double inheritance in any other circumstances.
That provision covers the situation where, for example, grandpar-
ents adopt the child of their deceased son. Upon death of the
grandparents, the adopted child would be entitled to receive two
intestate shares: one as the adopted child of the grandparents, and
one by representation as a natural descendant of the grandparents.
Under the new law the adopted child would receive only the larger
of the two shares. T'
V. SELF-PROVED WILL CLAUSE
Another significant change made by the 1981 legislature is the
addition of a new self-proved will clause.7 5 Execution of the origi-
nal self-proved will clause, 7 which was not affected by the amend-
ment, eliminates proof of signature requirements at time of pro-
bate.77 This form requires the testator and witnesses to sign both
64. U.P.C. § 2-103(4) (1969, 1974 and 1977 versions).
65. U.P.C., art. II, part 1, General Comment.
66. REvISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) § 91-403(1).
67. MCA 9 72-2-203(5) (1981).
68. MCA 9 72-2-203(4) (1981).
69. MCA 99 72-2-203(1) and -213(1) (1981).
70. U.P.C. § 2-109.
71. MCA § 72-2-213(1) (1981).
72. U.P.C. § 2-114.
73. Senate Bill 38, § 4, 47th Mont. Legislature (1981).
74. Id.
75. MCA § 72-2-304(2) (1981).
76. MCA § 72-2-304(1) (1981).
77. MCA § 72-3-309(2) (1981).
1981] 325
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the will and the self-proved clause. The new form, however, allows
one signature of each party to constitute both execution of the will
and execution of the self-proved will clause. Note that the amend-
ment would not have changed the result in Estate of Sample, 8
where the first form was used. In that case the Montana Supreme
Court held invalid a will which was signed only by the testator,
even though both the testator and the witnesses had signed the
self-proved will affidavit. Had the new self-proved will affidavit
been permitted by the statute at that time and, in fact, used, the
will would likely have been held valid. The practitioner must,
therefore, exercise care in the use of the forms; each form has a
different purpose and requirements.
VI. BONA FIDE PURCHASERS AND THE AUGMENTED ESTATE
The augmented estate concept is intended to ensure that a
surviving spouse, in a proceeding for an elective share, will receive
a fair proportion of the estate.7 The protection of the surviving
spouse is accomplished by including certain transfers of property
made by the decedent in the augmented estate. 0 The 1981 legisla-
ture adopted clarifying language which had been added to the
U.P.C. in 1975.81 The new language is designed to prevent inclu-
sion in the augmented estate of a transfer to a bona fide purchaser.
The need for the clarification arose in Colorado where real estate
experts felt the old language required inclusion in the augmented
estate of real property transferred by the decedent before death
where the document transferring title was not signed by the
spouse.82 In Montana, some title companies also require the
spouse's signature. Accordingly, language added to the U.P.C., and
now adopted in Montana, averts the addition to the augmented
estate of "the value of property transferred to anyone other than a
bona fide purchaser by the decedent."88 Another section defines a
bona fide purchaser as one who buys in good faith without knowl-
edge of any adverse claim, and provides that "[a]ny recorded in-
strument is prima facie evidence" of a transfer to a bona fide pur-
chaser.84 Thus, the burden of proof is placed on the person who
claims that the value of the transferred property should be in-
78. 175 Mont. 93, 572 P.2d 1232 (1977).
79. U.P.C., art. I, part 2, General Comment.
80. MCA § 72-2-205 (1981).
81. U.P.C. § 2-801.
82. U.P.C. § 2-202, Comment.
83. MCA § 72-2-705(1) (1981).
84. MCA § 72-2-705(4) (1981).
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cluded in the augmented estate because the surviving spouse did
not sign the document conveying title.
VII. ESTATE CLOSING REQUIREMENTS
Montana law states two conditions, in addition to the U.P.C.
requirements adopted in this state, that must be met before an
estate can be closed.8 5 Both of these conditions were amended by
the 1981 legislature. The first Montana requisite to estate closing
provides that the personal representative must deliver an account-
ing of receipts, expenditures, and claims against the estate to all
interested persons.8 6 The exception to the accounting has been
greatly expanded in the new provision. Formerly, an accounting
was unnecessary only where the personal representative was the
sole beneficiary of the estate.8 7 Now, if the personal representative
is the "sole residual beneficiary," ' no accounting need be deliv-
ered to interested persons.
Also affected by the new legislation is a second Montana pre-
condition to estate closing. A new provision removes an inconsis-
tency between the statute requiring payment of inheritance taxes
before an estate could be closed,8 9 and a statute allowing the De-
partment of Revenue to grant an extension of time for payment of
the tax. 0 Now the statute which used to require payment allows
for the extenson of time for payment.9 1
VIII. CONCLUSION
The changes made by the 1981 legislature to probate law in
Montana reflect, for the most part, an attempt to harmonize state
law with the U.P.C. The amendments both mirror changes in the
U.P.C. itself and adopt U.P.C. language that was not enacted when
Montana first legislated the U.P.C. in 1975. Close adherence to the
U.P.C. language has two advantages: it lessens the chance statutes
85. MCA §§ 72-3-1005 and -1006 (1981).
86. MCA § 72-3-1005(1) (1981). Interested persons are defined at MCA § 72-1-103(21)
(1981).
87. MCA § 72-3-1005(3) (1981).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. MCA § 72-3-1006(1) (1981). Note that the state inheritance tax for lineal descend-
ants has been repealed. 1981 MoNT. LAWS, ch. 202.
90. MCA § 72-16-438 (1981).
91. MCA § 72-3-1006(1)(b) (1981).
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will conflict, and it makes both case law in U.P.C. states and secon-
dary materials on the U.P.C. relevant and valuable sources of in-
formation for the Montana attorney.
Robert S. Mareott
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